Patrol 11 was deployed into an area west of Nui May Tao on 20 September 1969 and patrolled westward without contact until 27 September 1969.

THE INITIAL GROUND ACTION: 27 SEPTEMBER 1969

On 27 September 1969 at about 0835 hrs Patrol 11 contacted eight enemy at GR YS 642 953 and killed at least four of them, and possibly another two. The patrol withdrew north for 300 metres and at 0900 hrs they encountered approximately 20 - 30 more enemy who tried to encircle them. The patrol successfully broke contact at about 1030 hrs and withdrew a further 100 metres, formed an LUP and requested immediate extraction with communications being established through a UH-1H of 9 Squadron RAAF, to the SAS Squadron CP.

Map 1 shows the route followed on 26 September 1969, the area of the incident on 27 September 1969 and the subsequent route to the extraction point at GR YS 641 959.

PREPARATION FOR SUSPENDED EXTRACTION

The patrol members prepared for a suspended extraction by tying Swiss Seats around their bodies, to which their Karabinas were attached.

Control Element - ALBATROSS 01. The pilot of ALBATROSS 01 and Mission Leader was Squadron Leader NICOLLS. Other POB are not known.

• Pilot: Squadron Leader D. C. DERBY.
• Crewman: Leading Aircraftman R. P. BURTENSHAW.
• Gunner: Leading Aircraftman D. W. MACARTY.

Fire Support.

• BUSHRANGER 71. POB were:
  Pilot. Flying Officer M. R. TARDENT.
• BUSHRANGER 72. POB were:
  Leading Aircraftman C. J. WALTERS.
• BUSHRANGER 73. POB not known.

LIFT OUT

Five weighted ropes were lowered and the SOP was that the men hooked their Karabinas through the loop of a bowline knot at the end of their respective rope. Once each man had confirmed that he had hooked on, the patrol commander signalled the crew in the lift ship which then pulled out of the PZ and headed west to the LZ at GR YS 611 958.

Relative Positions During Lift Out. A picture is worth at least a thousand words, so here is a diagram that shows the relative positions of the five men during the lift out.

THE FALL

The soldier's body was seen to fall from extraction rope at 1123 hrs. The following persons actually saw FISHER fall:

• Flying Officer M. R. TARDENT - Pilot of BUSHRANGER 71. Tardent reported as follows: "The extracting aircraft lifted out of the Pick Up Zone. The patrol members appeared to be stable and riding well. However one member was riding low. I estimated that he was too low to reach the other members. The extraction aircraft headed in a westerly direction. I proceeded to overtake it with the intention of checking further on the patrol and to proceed ahead to recce the Landing Zone (LZ). As I approached to about 100 meters at the 7 o'clock position (clock code) at a height approx half way between the extraction aircraft and the suspended patrol I saw a man fall. I immediately transmitted a radio call to the extracting aircraft 'You have dropped one.' The patrol member appeared to spreadeagle himself as he fell. He appeared to go into the trees, slightly head down, on his back and with his feet forward. I started to turn to look for him. The mission leader instructed me to go to the LZ and clear it which I did after getting a rough pinpoint of the position where he fell."
• Private P. R. SAXTON - Patrol member. Private SAXTON was suspended about eight feet above FISHER and holding on to FISHER'S rope to prevent the ropes twisting. He reported that: "I felt his rope jerk, looked down and saw him falling away. I watched him fall into the jungle below, tried to get a fix on his position but could not say with any great accuracy where he had landed."
• Leading Aircraftman R. P. BURTENSHAW - Crewman in ALBATROSS 02. ALBATROSS 02 was the aircraft from which the five men were suspended. Leading Aircraftman R. P. BURTENSHAW reported as follows: "I was watching the patrol as a group when I saw one of the patrol fall from his rope and fall backwards. Before I could give warning to the pilot the Gunner (LAC MACARTY) said on the radio 'One of them has fallen.' I then watched the patrol member fall. He fell spread eagled and appeared to brush through the trees. I saw a splash of water."

RECOVERY OF REMAINING PATROL MEMBERS

Lateral Distance Travelled from PZ. The direction of travel from the PZ was west. Squadron Leader Derby indicated that the aircraft took a heading of 270 º from the PZ. Flying Officer M. R. TARDENT indicated that he headed in a "westerly direction." The following distances travelled from the PZ were reported:

• BURTENSHAW: "after we had gone 800 - 1,000 meters …" which equates on the map to GR YS 633 959 - 631 959.
• TARDENT: "The incident occurred after approximately 800 meters of lateral flight," or GR YS 633 959.
• SAXTON: "500 meters west of the SONG RAI." This estimate equates to 900 meters of lateral flight from the PZ, which would be in the vicinity of GR YS 632 959.

Although VAN DROFFELAAR did not see FISHER actually fall, he was made aware of the fact by one of his patrol members and initially estimated the incident location as GR YS 633 958. It is noted that in his Patrol Report VAN DROFFELAAR stated as follows: "1 ptl member fell approx 90 ft from rope, through lt (light) bush into water at est loc YS 633 957." On questioning during the Court of Inquiry he estimated that the lateral distance travelled from the pick up point would have been 1,300 meters, which would equate to GR YS 628 959 if the track of the aircraft were 270º.

It would be expected that the estimate of the distance from the PZ as made by TARDENT, the pilot would be reasonably accurate. In any case, the average of the estimates of those who saw FISHER fall, is 850 meters which is within 50 meters of the estimate by TARDENT.

No Equipment Jettisoned. For a rope extraction, the general procedure was to sling the weapon just before being lifted out. There is no evidence to indicate that any of FISHER'S equipment was jettisoned during the fall and although it is possible that his rifle may have separated from his body on impact, he would have landed with his equipment and with his rifle nearby, if not attached to his body.

Emplaning of Remaining Patrol Members. All aircraft involved in the extraction continued on to the LZ at GR YS 611 959 where the remaining four members of the patrol boarded ALBATROSS 02 through the port door. Ropes were detached from the helicopter and left on the LZ. There was some confusion regarding whether or not one rope was taken on board or not. VAN DROFFELAAR believed that one rope was taken on board; however, it would appear that all five ropes were subsequently recovered from the LZ on 29 September 1969.

Height of Fall. In the records available, a variety of heights are reported. Some are not clearly defined: they could be the "Height of the Aircraft," "Initial Height of FISHER above the Trees" or the "Actual Height above the Ground." Reliance is placed upon the reports that are clearly stated. For the purpose of this study, the height from which FISHER fell will be taken as 210 feet (64 meters).

GROUND IN THE INCIDENT AREA

Although the map Vietnam, XA CAM MY, Series L7014, 6430 I, 1: 50,000 which is based on information dated 1969, indicates that the incident area was covered by "Dense forest or jungle," the accounts by those who were on the ground indicate that the vegetative cover was not so dense. Nevertheless, when visualising the vegetative cover in the area it should be remembered that Patrol 11 was lifted out and Patrol 16 while operating in the area where FISHER may have fallen, roped in and was winched out. Hence there was more than likely a reasonable cover of jungle or scrub. In the general area of operations, over 52% of the annual rainfall is received in the months of July, August and September with average recordings of 13, 13 and 11 cm respectively for those months. In the general area of the incident conditions were as follows:

• Overall. The incident area was apparently fairly well waterlogged in September and October 1969. The SOUI SAP was running swiftly. The stands of jungle in the area had a good canopy and the height was approximately 70 feet with some areas defoliated. There were numerous bomb craters in the area and these were full of water.
• Area North of SOUI SAP. The ground cover in this area was apparently sufficiently dense to restrict ground searches although the visibility ranged from 20 to 150 meters. As reported above, there were numerous bomb craters in the area and these were full of water. The SONG RAI, on the eastern extremity of the area, and the SUOI SAP on the southern boundary were both flowing.
• Area South of SOUI SAP. Although there were apparently stands of jungle in this area, the vegetative cover was less dense than in the area to the north of the SOUI SAP. It is reasonable to assume that the enemy camp located by C Company 9 RAR at GR YS 633 955 would have been sighted to take advantage of overhead cover provided by the jungle canopy. Out to the west, about two kilometres, the country was open enough to provide at lease two LZ sufficient to fly in a Rifle Company. Again, there were numerous bomb craters in the area and these were full of water. The flat low lying areas were very sodden and some areas were under water.

DRESS AND EQUIPMENT OF FISHER

Dress. FISHER was wearing the following items:

• Camouflage suit,
• American patrol boots,
• Camouflage beret,
• Watch,
• Dog tags, and
• Camouflage cream on the face and naked parts of the body.

• One 7.62 mm SLR with 200 rounds of 7.62 mm ball ammunition;
• One Claymore mine with a delayed fuse;
• One WP, two M26 Grenades and two smoke grenades (red);
• One radio set, one red marker panel and one signal mirror;
• Map of Op Zone 0503, a compass and a protractor;
• Field pack and basic webbing with four full water bottles;
• Body line and karabiner attached to his body;
• Field dressing and morphine;
• Note book and aide memoire;
• Rations (2 days) plus an emergency ration; and,
• Paludrine and vitamin tablets for two days.

IMPACT SCENARIOS

The following four scenarios for the impact of FISHER appear to be possible. In all cases FISHER may have struck tree branches or a tree trunk during the fall, and subsequently either became lodged in the timber or fell to the ground. Considering the timber in the area was reported to be "light," although there were stands of jungle with a good canopy, the probability of FISHER striking timber before falling to the ground is assessed as less than probable.

• The probability of FISHER becoming lodged in the branches of a tree is assessed as very low.
• FISHER may or may not have struck timber during his fall but landed in soft mud and / or shallow water. Considering the fact that one eye-witness reported seeing a "splash," supported by anecdotal evidence from VAN DROFFELAAR, this option is assessed as one of low probability.
• FISHER may or may not have struck timber during the fall but landed in deep water (assume 7 feet deep). Simply on the basis that such water, 7 ft deep, would have been available in a small percentage of the incident area, the probability of this outcome is assessed as very low. If FISHER fell into the SUOI SAP, which was flowing at the time, his body may have been washed downstream but it is suggested that he probably would have snagged after a short distance considering his lack of buoyancy.
• FISHER may or may not have struck timber during the fall but landed on "firm" ground, relatively dry and covered with light undergrowth or grass to three feet high. The probability of this happening is assessed as more than probable.

MEDICAL OUTCOME OF THE FALL OF FISHER

The medical opinion given to the Court of Inquiry was that the outcome of such a fall would have "almost certainly been fatal. If it was not immediately fatal, the injuries that would have occurred would require urgent medical treatment." This opinion is further qualified by the statement that "In view of the four day lapse without being found, I think he would have died." Based on the evidence available, immediately after impact FISHER would have either been dead, seriously injured and unconscious, or seriously injured and conscious. If he were conscious, it would appear that his injuries would have been such that he would have been unable to move any distance before he died. This opinion is supported by Professor Tim Lyons. Professor Lyons, MBChB, MD, FRCS (Ed), FRC Path, FRCPA (Forensic) ACLM, Dip Av Med is currently the Director of Forensic Medicine, at the John Hunter Hospital, Newcastle, NSW.